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Abstract
Part I of this Note discusses the legal doctrines governing privileges and immunities of U.N.
officials and diplomats in international law. Part I also describes the manner in which diplomatic
and U.N. privileges and immunities are applied to the ICC. Part II outlines the conflict between
the goals of advancing human rights and preserving political sovereignty in international law. Part
III argues that the adoption of the Rome Statute compels an international responsibility to achieve
the goal of an effective and independent Court. This Note concludes that providing increased
privileges and immunities to ICC personnel at the expense of some degree of sovereignty will
assist in achieving this goal.
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INTRODUCTION
Ongoing armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia resulted
in allegations of gross human rights abuses of Bosnian Muslims
by Serbs.' A report issued by a United Nations2 ("U.N.") Special
Rapporteur chronicles the human rights situation in the terri-
tory.3 The report contains evidence of substantial contraven-
tions of international humanitarian law, mainly attributed to the
Serbian policies of ethnic cleansing.4 Such human rights abuses
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cated to my family for their unconditional love and support. I would like to thank
Jennifer Schense and the staff of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court for
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Journal who assisted in the publication of this Note.
1. See Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugosla-
via: The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 235,
236 (1994) (addressing legal scope for criminal proceedings). The Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia united six republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), two autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina),
and three major ethnic groups (Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs) into one state.
Id.; see Lucas W. Andrews, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia as a Failure ofJurisprudential Theory, 11 EMORY INT'L L. Rv. 471, 475-76
(1997) (providing history of war in territory). Conflict in the country b egan soon after
two of the republics, Croatia and Slovenia, formally declared their independence on
June 25, 1991. Id.
2. See United Nations, About The United Nations, at http://www.un.org/aboutun/
index.html (providing introduction to structure and work of United Nations ("U.N.")).
3. See generally United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situa-
tion of Human Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Commission
resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1993/50 (1993) (discussing Rapporteur's three missions to former Yugoslavia to investi-
gate human rights situation) [hereinafter Report on the Situation in former Yugosla-
via]. Three other reports by the Special Rapporteur are discussed and summarized in
this report: Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights of
28 August 1992 (E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9), Report to the Commission on Human Rights of
27 October 1992 (E./CN.4/1992/S-1/10), and Report to the forty-seventh session of
the General Assembly (A/47/666-S/24809). Id. at 4, para. 3. See alsoJoyner, supra note
1, at 248 (citing series of reports submitted by Special Rapporteur).
4. See Report on the Situation in former Yugoslavia, supra note 3, at 7, para. 17
(discussing variety of methods used in ethnic cleansing); see alsoJoyner, supra note 1, at
248-50 (explaining ethnic cleansing as mass numbers of Bosnian Muslims being system-
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include: widespread torture' of civilians and prisoners of war,
shooting of innocent civilians by snipers, destruction of churches
and civilian homes, systematic rape of Muslim women, forced
transfer of populations, and harassment of humanitarian relief
convoys. 5
On May 25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council approved the
establishment of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 ("ICTY').6 Although the ICTY accumu-
lated evidence and indicted alleged criminals, by 1996 the tribu-
nal encountered numerous setbacks.7 One such setback relates
to the ease with which Balkan states snubbed the ICTY and de-
nied ICTY officials certain privileges.'
In 1999, for example, Louise Arbour, the chief Prosecutor
of the ICTY, requested access to Kosovo to conduct on-site inves-
tigations.9 Such investigations are considered indispensable to
the work of an international tribunal.1 ° Former Yugoslav Presi-
dent Slobodan Milosevic, however, denied visas to many of Ar-
bour's team members and warned Arbour that she had no right
atically driven from their homes, incarcerated in concentration camps, tortured, raped,
and murdered).
5. See Report on the Situation in Yugoslavia, supra note 3, at 7 (describing general
observations regarding ethnic cleansing); see alsoJoyner, supra note 1, at 249-52 (dis-
cussing in further detail reports by U.N. Special Rapporteur).
6. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute]; seeJoyner, supra note 1, at 236 (addressing legal scope of criminal proceed-
ings).
7. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 484 (noting several reasons for difficulties encoun-
tered by ICTY). For example, Security Council member states refused to authorize its
forces to arrest suspects. Id. In addition, states refused to impose meaningful sanctions
upon Serbia or the Bosnian Serb government. Id.; see also RichardJ. Goldstone & Gary
Jonathan Bass, Lessons from Recent Criminal Tribunals, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 51, 52
(Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) (noting that ICTY faced difficulties with
funding, with hostility from members of U.N. Security Council, with staffing, and with
arrests).
8. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 7, at 56 (asserting that renegade regimes must not be
allowed to defy international tribunals).
9. See id. at 57 (describing Louise Arbour's efforts to gain access to Kosovo).
10. Id.
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to go to Kosovo. 1 On January 18, 2000, when Arbour again at-
tempted to gain access to Kosovo to investigate the massacre of
forty-five people, border guards refused her entry.
12
Commentators note that such outright obstruction as com-
mitted by the government of the former Yugoslavia must not be
permitted to become a feature of the permanent International
Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court")." U.N. delegates adopted
the Rome Statute of the ICC ("Rome Statute") on July 17,
1998."4 The Court will enter into force with sixty ratifications.15
As of the date of publication of this Note, 139 states signed and
twenty-nine states ratified the Rome Statute.16
11. See id. (noting that Milosevic's denial of tribunal's jurisdiction is part of his
ethnic cleansing campaign).
12. Id.; see Michel Leclercq, U.N. Seeks to override Russian reservations in vote on Ko-
sovo, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 19, 1999, at 1 (explaining U.N. Security Council's
demand that war crimes investigators be permitted into territory).
13. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 7, at 57 (discussing likelihood of renegade regimes
causing problems for International Criminal Court ("ICC")); Andrews, supra note 1.
14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (adopted by U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries on Establishment of an ICC); see United Nations, Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/. The Rome Statute cre-
ated the ICC. Article 1 of the Rome Statute reads:
An International Criminal Court is hereby established. It shall be a perma-
nent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over per-
sons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this
Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions
of this Statute.
Id.; Roy S. Lee, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF
THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 1, 26 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (ex-
plaining that Rome Statute was adopted by unrecorded vote of 120 in favor, seven
against, and 21 abstentions).
15. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 126(1) (stating that "[tlhis Statute shall
enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of
the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations"); see also Christophe de Roquefeuil,
US Unlikely to Ratify Permanent International Criminal Tribunal, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Jan.
1, 2001 (reporting that U.N. officials expect treaty will be ratified by minimum of 60
countries by middle of 2002).
16. See Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Signs Treaty For World Court To Try Atrocities, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al (noting recent signatories to treaty); see also The Coalition for
an International Criminal Court Home Page on the ICC, at http://www.iccnow.org
(listing ratifications as of February 12, 2001, by the following countries: Argentina, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Belize, Botswana, Canada, Dominica, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Ger-
many, Ghana, Iceland, Italy, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mali, Marshall Islands, New Zea-
land, Norway, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Tajikistan, Trini-
dad and Tobago, and Venezuela). President Clinton overrode objections from both
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The Rome Statute gives the ICC the authority to investigate
and prosecute individuals who commit the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community,17 such as geno-
cide,"8 crimes against humanity,' 9 and war crimes °.2  Similar to
the ICTY, such prosecutions and investigations may necessitate
the Pentagon and Republicans in the Senate and signed the Rome Statute on Decem-
ber 31, 2000. Myers, supra. Under the provisions of the Rome Statute, nations had
until the end of December 31, 2000, to sign. Id. After that date, states could only
become a party to the treaty by ratifying. Id. According to one commentator, the
United States signature represents a "powerful American endorsement of the treaty's
goals, and poses a political and diplomatic challenge for the upcoming administration
of George W. Bush." Id. In a statement released by the White House, President Clinton
said "he remained concerned about 'significant flaws' in the treaty that he hoped would
be corrected in negotiations before the Court becomes a reality." Id.; see Clinton's
Words: "The Right Action", N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A6 (reprinting President Clinton's
speech). United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Jesse Helms,
stated: "I will make reversing this decision, and protecting America's fighting men and
women from the jurisdiction of this international kangaroo court, one of my highest
priorities in the new Congress." Roquefeuil, supra note 15. Upon the required mini-
mum 60 ratifications, the ICC will be set up, with or without United States ratification.
Id. United Nations officials expect the treaty will be ratified by the minimum of 60
countries by the middle of 2002. Id.
17. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 5. Article 5 states:
(1) Thejurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has juris-
diction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following
crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
(2) The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Id.
18. Id. art. 6. Article 6 states:
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
19. Id. art. 7. Article 7 states:
For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the
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on-site visits by the Prosecutor. 2' The various practical arrange-
ments being prepared by the U.N., such as the Agreement on
Privileges and Immunities of the ICC, must therefore be strong
to avoid rendering ICC personnel ineffective. 22
Part I of this Note discusses the legal doctrines governing
privileges and immunities of U.N. officials and diplomats in in-
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation
of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any indentifiable group or collectivity on political, ra-
cial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph
3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Id.
20. Id. art. 8. Article 8, in part, states:
(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.
(2) For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property pro-
tected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(i) Willful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhumane treatment, including biological experi-
ments;
(iii) Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wan-
tonly.
Id.
21. Id, art. 99(4).
22. See Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.183/10*
(1998), res. F, para. 5 [hereinafter Final Act] (naming practical arrangements to be
prepared for establishment of Court).
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ternational law. Part I also describes the manner in which diplo-
matic and U.N. privileges and immunities are applied to the
ICC. Part II outlines the conflict between the goals of advancing
human rights and preserving political sovereignty in interna-
tional law. Part III argues that the adoption of the Rome Statute
compels an international responsibility to achieve the goal of an
effective and independent Court. This Note concludes that pro-
viding increased privileges and immunities to ICC personnel at
the expense of some degree of sovereignty will assist in achieving
this goal.
I. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES GOVERNING OFFICIALS
AND DIPLOMATS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A privilege is a substantive exemption from the law.23 Im-
munity grants a procedural protection from the receiving state,
as opposed to applying an exemption from substantive law.2 4 In
international law, privileges and immunities are applied to diplo-
mats, international organizations, and officials of such organiza-
25tions. Currently, privileges and immunities are being applied
to the workings of the ICC in a model guided by current diplo-
matic law and the law of international organizations.26
A. Privileges And Immunities Applied To Diplomats And United
Nations Officials
Diplomats of independent states and officials of interna-
tional organizations possess certain privileges and immunities in
international law.27 Diplomatic law is controlled by the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations28 ("Vienna Convention").
23. SeeJ. CRA.IG BARKER, THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 67
(1996) (citing Satow's Guide as leading manual on diplomatic practice). This defini-
tion is found in SATow's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 120 (Gore-Booth & Longman
eds., 1979). Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1137 (Bruno
Simma ed., 1994) (providing overview of U.N. system of privileges and immunities).
26. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 48 (describing types of privileges and
immunities enjoyed by Court and personnel).
27. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 25, at 1137 (discussing
multitude of legal instruments in system of privileges and immunities in international
law).
28. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (stating that 177 states are now party to Vienna Con-
vention).
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The law governing the privileges and immunities of interna-
tional organizations, such as the U.N., developed after the U.N.'s
establishment.2 9 It is controlled primarily by the U.N. Charter
and is supplemented by additional international instruments. 30
1. Diplomatic Immunity Under The Vienna Convention On
Diplomatic Relations
Diplomatic law is one of the oldest branches of interna-
tional law. 1 The Vienna Convention controls the conduct, limi-
tations, and privileges of diplomats throughout the world.3 2 It is
a universal, comprehensive formulation of the rules of modern
diplomatic law 33 and is often used as a reference in developing
related areas of international law.34 Its provisions are regarded
as settled law.33
The Vienna Convention succeeded in gaining formal sup-
port partially because of the notion of reciprocity.36 In diplo-
matic relations, reciprocity denotes every state, both sending
states and receiving states. v If a receiving state fails to accord
29. 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 315 (1995).
30. See id. (providing examples of additional instruments as special agreements
with member states or agreements with host states).
31. See generally BARKER, supra note 23, at 14 (providing history of development of
diplomatic relations from origins in antiquity up to present time).
32. See Vienna Convention, supra note 28; see also Joshua D. Groff, A Proposal for
Diplomatic Accountability Using the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: The Decline
of the Absolute Sovereign Right, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 209, 210 (2000) (discussing
history and background of diplomatic immunity).
33. See Vienna Convention, supra note 28; EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAw: A COM-
MENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 2 (1998).
34. See DENZA, supra note 33, at 2 (noting universality of Vienna Convention).
35. See id. (discussing that Vienna Convention significantly developed area of priv-
ileges and immunities through numerous provisions). Article 22 establishes the inviola-
bility of mission premises; Article 27, the protection of all forms of diplomatic commu-
nication (viewed as the most important aspect of the functioning of the diplomatic
mission); Article 31, the exceptions to the immunity of a diplomat from civil jurisdic-
tion; Article 34, the exemption of diplomats from taxes; and Article 37, the limitations
of civil immunity of administrative and technical staff with respect to official acts, but
allows them full immunity from criminal jurisdiction. Id. Articles 22, 27, 31, 34, and 37
are all consistent with the functional approach to diplomatic immunity. Id. The Vi-
enna Convention reinforces the functional necessity approach in the varying degrees of
immunity granted to members of the diplomatic staff. Id. at 5.
36. See id. at 1-2 (indicating that reciprocity forms effective sanction for observance
of nearly all rules of Convention).
37. See id. (noting that main functions of diplomatic mission is to represent send-
ing state and protect its interests and nationals and to negotiate with receiving state).
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privileges or grant immunities to diplomatic missions or their
representatives, the sending state will likely undertake counter-
measures.
38
The Vienna Convention has proven resilient to external at-
tacks.39 During the 1980s, however, several diplomats abused
their immunity in the United Kingdom and in the United
States.4" In 1982, a Brazilian ambassador's grandson shot an in-
dividual outside a nightclub in Washington, D.C.4 1 In 1985, the
wife of a Nigerian diplomat slashed her daughter's wrist after
learning of her pregnancy. 42 Recently, in 1997, an intoxicated
senior diplomat from the Republic of Georgia struck and killed
a sixteen year-old girl in Washington D.C.4 3
Several possible actions extinguish immunity of an abusive
diplomat under the Vienna Convention.44 First, an express
waiver of immunity by the sending state exposes the diplomat to
the jurisdiction of the host state.4 5 Second, the host state may
require the sending state to either recall the person concerned
or terminate his functions with the mission.4 6
38. See id. (noting that failure to accord privileges and immunities to diplomatic
missions or their members is apparent immediately).
39. See id. at 6 (providing, however, examples of abuse of immunity).
40. See id. (noting that number of abuses is small).
41. See Groff, supra note 32, at 210 (providing details of recent examples of diplo-
matic abuse).
42. Id. at 218.
43. Id. No charges were brought against any of these offenders because they were
protected by diplomatic immunity. See id. (providing further details of examples of
diplomatic abuse). See DENZA, supra note 33, at 6 (noting that because of the overall
need for the protection of their diplomats against terrorism and violence, governments
chose not to revise Vienna Convention). Instead, governments used the remedies al-
ready provided for in the Vienna Convention, and invoked countermeasures on a basis
of reciprocity. Id.
44. See Groff, supra note 32, at 214 (providing general discussion on Vienna Con-
vention).
45. See Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 32 (stating, in part, that "immunity
from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons enjoying immunity under Article
37 may be waived by the sending state"); see also Groff, supra note 32, at 214-15 (noting
that this would expose diplomat to jurisdiction of host country).
46. See Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 9 (stating, in part, that "[t]he receiv-
ing state may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending
state that the head of the mission of any member of the diplomatic mission is persona
non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable"); see
Groff, supra note 32, at 214 (explaining that in such situation if sending state fails
within reasonable period to remove individual, that diplomat may lose immunity and
be subject to criminal or civil liability).
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Countries normally comply with the Vienna Convention.47
This compliance, however, generally has not extended to two
provisions: Article 26 and Article 27.48 Article 26 requires a re-
ceiving state to ensure freedom of movement and travel within
its territory to members of diplomatic missions.4 9 In violation of
Article 26, many Communist states used to bar large parts of
their territory to diplomats who had not been given special per-
mission to enter, notwithstanding the ratification of the Vienna
Convention. 5° Second, Article 27 permits and protects mission
members free communication for official purposes.5 1 States that
possess the capacity to intercept embassy communications often
disregard this Article.5
2
2. Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Officials
The constituent instrument of the U.N. determines the priv-
ileges and immunities of the organization.5 ' This instrument
may be supplemented by agreements with the member states
and the host state. 54 Both the ICTY and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Ge-
nocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanita-
rian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations com-
mitted in the territory of neighboring states, between January 1,
1994 and December 31, 199415 ("ICTR") are subsidiary organs of
47. DENZA, supra note 33, at 6.
48. See Vienna Convention, supra note 28, arts. 26-27; see also DENZA, supra note 33,
at 8 (providing details on few instances of non-compliance).
49. See Vienna Convention, supra note 28 art. 26 (stating "[s]ubject to its laws and
regulations concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of
national security, the receiving state shall ensure to all members of the mission freedom
of movement and travel in its territory").
50. DENZA, supra note 33, at 9 (noting, however, this problem in recent years is
diminishing due to disappearances of restrictions on movement in states that are no
longer Communist).
51. See Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 27(1) (stating in part "[t]he receiv-
ing state shall permit and protect free communication on the part of the mission for all
official purposes"); DENZA, supra note 33, at 9.
52. See DENZA, supra note 33, at 9 (noting that with end of Cold War came reduc-
tion of complaints of violations of right to free and secret communication).
53. MoRRis, supra note 29, at 315.
54. See id. (discussing law of privileges and immunities of international organiza-
tions).
55. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
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the U.N. and, therefore, also rely on U.N. instruments to provide
privileges and immunities.56
a. United Nations Instruments of Privileges and Immunities
The privileges and immunities of the U.N. are based on
three primary instruments: the U.N. Charter,5 7 specifically Arti-
cle 105;5 the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
U.N.;5 9 and the U.N. Headquarters Agreement.6" Article 105 of
the U.N. Charter establishes the principle of functional necessity
of privileges and immunities.6' Functional necessity means that
an international organization is entitled to the immunities it re-
quires to effectively fulfill its tasks. 6 2 All major status conven-
tions63 now contain this principle, which is an underlying rule in
the system of privileges and immunities.64
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for geno-
cide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states, be-
tweenJanuary 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter ICTR].
56. See MoRIS, supra note 29, at 316 (discussing categories of privileges and immu-
nities of ICTY).
57. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153 [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER].
58. Id. art. 105. Article 105 states:
(1) The organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its pur-
poses;
(2) Representatives of the Members of the U.N. and officials of the Organiza-
tion shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary
for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
organization;
(3) The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to deter-
mining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article
or may propose conventions to the Members of the U.N. for this purpose.
Id.
59. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N., Feb. 13, 1946, 1
U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Convention].
60. See MORRIS, supra note 29, at 315-16 (providing background information on
law governing privileges and immunities of international organizations).
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 105; see THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SUpra note
25, at 1139 (discussing implementation of Article 105 of U.N. Charter).
62. See A.S. MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES: As-
PEerS OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 151 (1995) (discussing international immunity and
functional necessity).
63. See THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1138-1139 (providing exam-
ples of status agreements on U.N. institutions such as information centers, research
centers, and science institutions).
64. See id. at 1139 (discussing functional necessity of privileges and immunities).
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The U.N. implemented Article 105(3) through multilateral
conventions, host nation agreements,6 5 and domestic legislation
by states.66 The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
U.N. is one major multilateral convention.67 This Convention
provides immunity for both the U.N. and its personnel.6 Under
the Convention on Privileges and Immunities, the U.N. enjoys
absolute immunity as a juridical person from any form of legal
proceedings before national courts.69 U.N. officials enjoy func-
tional immunity in that they enjoy immunity from the jurisdic-
tion of the host country with respect to their official acts and
words spoken. °
The provisions of the, Convention on Privileges and Immu-
nities allow U.N. officials free entry into, and departure from,
65. See THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1137 (explaining category of
host nation agreements). The category of host nation agreements comprises:
(1) Seat agreements, i.e. agreements on the status of central and regional of-
fices of the U.N. (principal or subsidiary organs) permanently established
in host countries, and respective privileges and immunities;
(2) Status agreements on U.N. institutions, such as for example information
centers, research and science institutions (U.N. University of Tokyo);
(3) Privileges and immunities and facilities of U.N. field offices (technical as-
sistance projects, environment programs, etc.);
(4) The status of U.N. peace missions (observers, peace-keeping forces, ser-
vice staff);
(5) The privileges and immunities of participants at U.N. conferences and
seminars hosted by member or non-member states.
Id. at 1138-1139.
66. See U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 3 (stating "[t]he General Assembly may make
recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the
U.N. for this purpose"); see THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1137-1138
(classifying system of privileges and immunities that implemented Article 105 as com-
prehensive).
67. Convention, supra note 59; see THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at
1139 (describing Convention as instrument on which U.N. privileges and immunities is
based).
68. See THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1139 (discussing privileges and
immunities provided for U.N. and its personnel).
69. Convention, supra note 59, art. 11/2; see THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note
25, at 1140-1141 (noting absolute immunity of U.N. and noting further that U.N. prem-
ises and property are inviolable under Article 11/3 of Convention, as are U.N. archives
and documents under 11/4 of Convention).
70. Convention, supra note 59, art. V/18; see THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note
25, at 1142 (explaining that U.N. has exclusive competence to decide what constitutes
"official act" because U.N. immunity would be jeopardized if decision was left to na-
tional courts). In addition, the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-Generals,
together with their spouses and children, enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Id.
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the host country.7 1 U.N. officials only enjoy freedom of move-
ment within host countries during official journeys.72 They do
not enjoy privileges on private journeys.73 The free movement
of officials within the host country, however, continues to be a
matter of controversy. 4
Experts on missions,7 5 who serve under a specific but tem-
porary U.N. mandate, enjoy privileges and immunities strictly re-
lated to their official function. 76 Such immunities are also lim-
ited to the duration of their mission.7 7 Representatives of U.N.
Members, 78 permanent missions, 7 1 and staff of missions enjoy
partial diplomatic privileges if they are non-residents and full
diplomatic privileges and immunities if they are permanent
staff.8 ° Finally, according to the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the U.N., the Secretary-General must waive
the immunity of any official when, in his opinion, the immunity
would impede the c6uirse of justice and can be waived without
prejudice to the U.N.81
The case of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy,12 the U.N. Special
71. Convention, supra note 59, art. V/18(d). See THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra
note 25, at 1143 (discussing freedom of movement under Convention).
72. See THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1143-1144.
73. See id. (elaborating further on freedom of movement for U.N. officials).
74. See id. (emphasizing that seat agreements do not normally permit unrestricted
travel by U.N. officials within territory of host country; while host countries are obliged
under U.N. Charter to abstain from selective restrictions against diplomats).
75. See Convention, supra note 59, art. VI (defining role of experts on missions for
U.N.). The term "experts on missions" covers U.N. representatives who do not perform
their duties on a permanent contractual basis but are serving under a temporary man-
date of the U.N. THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1144.
76. See THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1144 (describing privileges and
immunities of experts on missions).
77. See id. (discussing further Article VI of Convention).
78. Convention, supra note 59, art. IV(16). According to Article IV(16) of the
Convention, "Representatives" of U.N. Members are all delegates, deputy delegates, ad-
visors, technical experts, and secretaries of delegations. THE CHARTER OF THE U.N.,
supra note 25, at 1145.
79. THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1145. Members of the mission are
defined as "the head of the mission and the members of the staff of the mission." See
Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 1 (b).
80. See THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra note 25, at 1145 (detailing most important
privileges of non-resident representatives to be unrestricted entry to and departure
from U.N. headquarters).
81. Convention, supra note 59, art. V, sec. 20.
82. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Com-
mission on Human Rights, (Apr. 29, 1999), at http://www.icj-cij.org. On August 10, 1998,
the U.N. Economic and Social Council requested an advisory opinion from the Interna-
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Rapporteur 83 on the Independence of judges and Lawyers, is an
example of denial of an immunity by a state.8 4 As a Special Rap-
porteur, Cumaraswamy is an expert on an ongoing mission and
is entitled to immunity from legal process of any kind under the
Convention for his official functions.8 5 In 1997, however, vari-
ous Malaysian plaintiffs brought four defamation suits against
Cumaraswamy, claiming damages in excess of US$100,000,000, 6
notwithstanding Malaysia's being a party to the Convention on
Privileges and Immunities without reservation. 7
A second example of the denial of privileges and immuni-
ties to U.N. personnel is the increase in killings, assaults, and
kidnappings of U.N. civilian staff since the early 1990s.88 The
U.N. has taken concrete steps to improve the situation, such as,
tional Court of Justice on the applicability of Article VI, Section 22 of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N. in the case of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy.
Id.
83. Id. The Special Rapporteur, as a person appointed by the Commission on
Human Rights, is defined as an expert on a mission. Id.
84. Peter H.F. Bekker, Memorandum of Lauyers Committee for Human Rights on Legal
Issues Arising from the Case Concerning the Difference relating to Immunity from Legal Process of
a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights before the International Court of Jus-
tice, (1998), at http://www.lchr.org.
85. See id. (noting that U.N. Secretary-General has authority to determine whether
expert on mission spoke words in course of performance of mission for U.N.).
86. See id. (detailing legal issues at stake). In 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
found that Cumaraswamy was immune. Id. In addition, in April 1999 the International
Court ofJustice ("ICJ") put forth a decision that stated that the Malaysian courts must
provide Cumaraswamy with immunity. Id. According to the ICJ, Cumaraswamy made
the statements in his capacity as a Special Rapporteur and, therefore, was entitled to
immunity under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the U.N. Id. On July
7, 2000, over a year after the ICJ announced its opinion, the Malaysian High Court
struck down one of the suits. Id. The Court, however, ordered Cumaraswamy to bear
the costs of the litigation. Id. As of August 2000, the three companion cases were still
pending. Id.; see also Peter H.F. Bekker, International Decision: Difference Relating to Immu-
nity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 93 A.J.I.L.
913 (1999).
87. See RIcHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS;
PROBLEMS OF LAw, POLICY, AND PRAc-rICE 250 (3d ed., 1995) (defining reservation as
qualifying proviso).
88. See U.N. Press Release, 'We Must Not Let Violence Drive Us Out' Says Deputy
Secretary-General to Security Council Meeting on Protection of U.N. Personnel, DSG/
SM/84, SC/6804 (Feb. 9, 2000) (noting that examples of attacks include shooting
down of two U.N. planes in Angola in December 1998 and January 1999, and killings of
two staff members of Food and Agricultural Organization in Baghdad). Since January
1992, 184 staff members died in the service of the U.N. Id. Ninety-eight of the 184
were murdered. Id.; see also U.N. Press Release, State Representatives Express Deep
Regret at Killing of Two FAO Colleagues in Baghdad, ORG/1308 (June 30, 2000) (pro-
viding statement of Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette to Security Council that
2001] INTERNATIONAL. CRIMINAL COURT 1001
the Convention on the Safety of U.N. and Associated Personnel
("Safety Convention"). *9 The Safety Convention entered into
force on January 15, 1999, and therefore its long-term impact
remains to be seen.90
b. Privileges and Immunities of the Ad Hoc Tribunals
Pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,9' the U.N. Se-
curity Council established both the ICTY and the ICTR.92 The
two tribunals are subsidiary organs of the U.N.93 Thus, the privi-
U.N. personnel includes not only military and police staff, but also thousands of civil-
ians who serve in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian missions).
89. Convention on the Safety of U.N. and Associated Personnel, GA Res. 49/59
(Dec. 9, 1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 482 (1995) [hereinafter Safety Convention]. See
generally Evan T. Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of U.N. and
Associated Personnel, 89 A.J.I.L. 621, 621 (1995) (providing background information on
Safety Convention). The Safety Convention covers two types of personnel:
(1) "U.N. personnel" which includes persons engaged or deployed by the
U.N. Secretary-General as members of the military, police or civilian com-
ponents of a U.N. operation; and
(2) "Associated personnel" which describes
(a) persons assigned by the U.N. Secretary-General or an intergovern-
mental organization with the agreement of the competent organ of
the U.N.,
(b) persons engaged by the Secretary-General, a specialized agency, or
the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"), and
(c) persons deployed by a humanitarian nongovernmental organization
("NGO") or agency under an agreement with the Secretary-General, a
specialized agency or the IAEA.
Id.; see Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 8(2)(b)(iii) (providing special protection for
peacekeepers). Under this provision, any intentional attacks against personnel, mate-
rial, units, or vehicles involved in humanitarian or peacekeeping missions constitute
war crimes and under certain circumstances, crimes against humanity. Id. See Roy S.
Lee, supra note 14, at 29 (providing further detail on consequences of attacks on
peacekeeping missions).
90. See Major Newton, United States Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel Enters into Force, ARMw LAWYER, Feb., 1999 (discussing need for multi-
lateral Safety Convention and its foreseeable impacts).
91. See generally U.N. CHARTER ch. VII (serving as mechanism authorizing Security
Council to adopt measures which permit use of force to bring nations into compliance
with U.N. resolutions).
92. ICTY Statute, supra note 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 55. See MoRRIs, supra note
29, at 317 (providing background information on tribunals).
93. See U.N. CHARTER art. 29 (stating "[t]he Security Council may establish such
subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions"); MORRIs,
supra note 29, at 317 n.807 (noting that preamble to Headquarters Agreement between
U.N. and Netherlands recognizes status of ICTY as subsidiary organ within meaning of
Article 29). However, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia) has
expressed the view that the ICTY cannot be deemed a subsidiary organ under Article
29. Id.
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leges and immunities of the tribunals and their personnel are
governed, in part, by the Convention on Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the U.N.94
i. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The privileges and immunities of the ICTY are based on
three primary instruments:95 the ICTY Statute,96 specifically Arti-
cle 30;" 7 the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
U.N.98 and the Headquarters Agreement between the U.N. and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands.99 Article 30 of the ICTY Stat-
ute sets forth the status, privileges, and immunities of the
ICTY. °00 According to Article 30(2), the Judges, the Prosecu-
tor,101 and the Registrar 1°2 of the ICTY are entitled to the privi-
94. Id. The term "organization", in Article 105(1) of the U.N. Charter encom-
passes all principle and subsidiary organs of the U.N. THE CHARTER OF THE U.N., supra
note 25, at 1139; MORRIS, supra note 29, at 317 n.808.
95. MORRIS, supra note 29, at 315-16.
96. ICTY Statute, supra note 6.
97. ICTY Statute, supra note 6. Article 30 reads:
(1) The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N. of 13 Feb-
ruary 1946 shall apply to the International Tribunal, the judges, the Prose-
cutor and his staff, and the Registrar and his staff.
(2) The judges, the Prosecutor and the Registrar shall enjoy the privileges
and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys
in accordance with international law.
(3) The staff of the Prosecutor and of the Registrar shall enjoy the privileges
and immunities accorded to officials of the .U.N. under Articles V and VII
of the Convention referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(4) Other persons, including the accused, required at the seat of the Interna-
tional Tribunal shall be accorded such treatment as is necessary for the
proper functioning of the International Tribunal.
Id.
98. Convention, supra note 59.
99. Moms, supra note 29, at 315-16. The Headquarters Agreement is contained
in U.N. Doc. S/1994/848. Id. at 317.
100. Id. at 316.
101. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 16. According to Article 16 of the ICTY Stat-
ute:
(1) The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution
of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January
1991.
(2) The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Interna-
tional Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any
Government or from any other source.
(3) The Office of the Prosecutor shall be composed of a Prosecutor and such
other qualified staff as may be required.
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leges and immunities of diplomatic envoys as provided in the
Vienna Convention. 10 3 Whether acting within their official du-
ties or not, these individuals are entitled to absolute immunity
from arrest and criminal prosecution, their residences and bag-
gage are inviolable, and they are exempt from all forms of taxa-
tion. 10 4
Although senior officials of the ICTY are entitled to diplo-
matic immunities, staff members of the ICTY are accorded only
functional immunities. 10 5 Staff members are therefore afforded:
immunity from arrest and legal process for acts taken in an offi-
cial capacity, 1°' immunity from taxation on salaries, 107 immunity
(4) The Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Security Council on nomination
by the Secretary-General. He or she shall be of high moral character and
possess the highest level of competence and experience in the conduct of
investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases. The Prosecutor shall
serve for a four-year term and be eligible for reappointment. The terms
and conditions of service of the Prosecutor shall be those of an Under-
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
(5) The staff of the Office of the Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Secre-
tary-General on the recommendation of the Prosecutor.
Id.
102. Id. art. 17. According to Article 17 of the ICTY Statute:
(1) The Registry shall be responsible for the administration and servicing of
the International Tribunal.
(2) The Registry shall consist of a Registrar and such other staff as may be
required.
(3) The Registrar shall be appointed by the Secretary-General after consulta-
tion with the President of the International Tribunal. He or she shall
serve for a four-year term and be eligible for reappointment. The terms
and conditions of service of the Registrar shall be those of an Assistant
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
(4) The staff of the Registry shall be appointed by the.Secretary General on
the recommendation of the Registrar.
Id.
103. Id art. 30(2); see MoRRis, supra note 29; at 317 (explaining that diplomatic
envoys and their families are accorded absolute immunity from arrest or criminal prose-
cution, and their private residences are completely inviolable).
104. See Moims, supra note 29, at 318 (describing that in this way, ICTY is granted
broader privileges and immunities than ICJ). Article 19 of the Statute of the ICJ pro-
vides: "[t]he members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the Court, shall
enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities." Id. at 318 n.811.
105. Convention, supra note 59, art. V, sec. 18. MoIs, supra note 29, at 318 (not-
ing that functional immunity means that individuals are entitled to privileges and im-
munities to extent that they are required to effectively fulfill their tasks). Diplomatic
immunities are the privileges and immunities of diplomatic envoys as laid out in the
Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 28.
106. MoIs, supra note 29, at 318.
107. Id.
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from customs duties on furniture at the time when staff mem-
bers begin their positions,1 0 8 and immunity from the obligation
of national service. 109 Since staff members enjoy immunity from
legal proceedings only in the course of official duties, 1 ' they
may therefore be tried and convicted in connection with non-
official acts." l '
Article 30(4) of the ICTY Statute 'sets forth a category of in-
dividuals, including witnesses, suspects, the accused, and defense
counsel," 2 who are accorded the privileges and immunities nec-
essary for the functioning of the tribunal. 1 3 The ICTY Statute
grants less immunity to these individuals because they do not
require the same degree of privileges and immunities as the staff
and officials of the ICTY.114 Therefore, a state would be re-
quired to allow a witness to be transported through its territory
in order to testify before the ICTY, even though national author-
ities may wish to detain the witness." 5
ii. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Just as Article 30 of the ICTY Statute sets forth the status,
privileges, and immunities of the ICTY," 6 Article 29 of the ICTR
Statute establishes the status, privileges, and immunities of the
ICTR.117 The wording of the two provisions is identical."'
108. Id.
109. See id. (discussing Article V of Convention on Privileges and Immunities of
U.N.).
110. See id. (noting that staff members must claim their immunity in course of
judicial proceedings by showing that act in question was official).
111. See id. (noting that they may be tried in same manner as private person).
112. Id. The Statute does not provide for a separate public defenders office. MOR-
Pis, supra note 29, at 318 n.814.
113. ICTY Statute, supra note 6. Article 30(4) states: "[o]ther persons, including
the accused, required at the seat of the International Tribunal shall be accorded such
treatment as is necessary for the proper functioning of the International Tribunal." Id.
114. See MORRIS, supra note 29, at 318-19 (noting that it would be abhorrent to
confer on indicted war criminals privileges and immunities of United Nations officials
or diplomats).
115. See id. at 319 (explaining that Tribunal's proceedings should not be delayed
because witness or accused is detained for questioning regarding national criminal pro-
ceeding in transit state).
116. ICTY Statute, art. 30, supra note 6.
117. ICTR Statute art. 29 supra note 55. Article 29 states:
(1) The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N. of 13 Feb-
ruary 1946 shall apply to the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the
judges, the Prosecutor and his or her staff, and the Registrar and his or
her staff.
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Thus, the privileges and immunities afforded to the ICTR and its
personnel are the same as those granted to the ICTY." 9
B. Privileges and Immunities Applied to the ICC and Its Personnel
Article 48 of the Rome Statute provides the basic privileges
and immunities of the Court.1 20 Article 48 also announces that
it will be supplemented by an agreement on privileges and im-
munities of the Court. 2 1 Discussions regarding this agreement
are ongoing as of January 2001.122
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having adopted the Rome Statute in 1998, the U.N. Confer-
ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an ICC de-
cided to establish the Preparatory Commission for an ICC
1 23
("PrepCom") in order to complete the necessary arrangements
for the Court.1 4 The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities
of the Court is one such arrangement. 12' This agreement will
supplement articles of the Rome Statute relating to the privi-
leges and immunities of the ICC and its personnel, such as Arti-
cle 48.126
(2) The judges, the Prosecutor and the Registrar shall enjoy the privileges
and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys,
in accordance with international law.
(3) The staff of the Prosecutor and of the Registrar shall enjoy the privileges
and immunities accorded to officials of the U.N. under Articles V and VII
of the Convention referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(4) Other persons, including the accused, required at the seat or meeting
place of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall be accorded such
treatment as is necessary for the proper functioning of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda.
Id.
118. ICTY Statute, supra note 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 55.
119. ICTY Statute, supra note 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 55.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 48.
121. Id.
122. See General Assembly resolution 55/155 (requesting Secretary-General to re-
convene Preparatory Commission for ICC ("PrepCom") from February 26 to March 9,
2001, and from September 24 to October 5, 2001).
123. See Final Act, supra note 22 (establishing PrepCom).
124. See id. at res. F, para. 5(a) - (h) (listing practical arrangements to be pre-
pared).
125. Id. at res. F, para. 5(f).
126. Id.
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a. Background to the Preparatory Commission for an ICC
The PrepCom, consisting of the signatories of the Final Act
of the Rome Conference as well as the invitees to the Rome Con-
ference,1 27 is charged with the task of preparing the following
practical arrangements for the establishment of the Court:
1 21
the rules of procedure of evidence; elements of crimes, a rela-
tionship agreement between the Court and the U.N., basic prin-
ciples governing a headquarters agreement to be negotiated be-
tween the Court and the host country, financial regulations and
rules, an agreement of the privileges and immunities of the
court, a budget for the first financial year, and the rules of proce-
dure of the Assembly of States Parties. ,
The PrepCom met a mandated deadline ofJune 30, 2000,130
to complete work on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and
Elements of Crimes. 13 1 At the Sixth Session of the PrepCom,
which convened from November 27 to December 8, 2000, dele-
gates discussed three arrangements laid out in Resolution F: the
financial regulations and rules,13 2 the relationship agreement be-
tween the Court and the U.N.,' 3' and the agreement on privi-
leges and immunities of the Court.
1 34
127. See id. at res. F, para. 2 (stating "[t] he Commission shall consist of representa-
tives of states which have signed the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Confer-
ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court and
other states which have been invited to participate in the Conference").
128. Id.
129. Id. at res. F, para. 5(a) - (h).
130. See id. res. F, para. 6 (stating "[t]he draft texts of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence and of the Elements of Crimes shall be finalized before 30 June 2000").
131. See U.N. Press Release, Preparatory Commission for an International Criminal
Court Adopts Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Text on Elements of Crimes, L/
2963, (Jun. 30, 2000) (discussing completion of such arrangements by deadline).
132. See U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.1 (2000) (summarizing proceedings of
PrepCom at sixth session). For the discussion paper proposed by the coordinator of
the financial regulations and rules, see U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.1/Add.2,
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm.
133. See U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.1 (2000). For the discussion paper
proposed by the coordinator of the draft relationship agreement between the Court
and the U.N., see U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.1/Add.1, available at http://
www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm.
134. U.N. Press Release, L/2963, supra note 131. For the discussion paper pro-
posed by the coordinator of the Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Court [hereinafter Draft Agreement], see U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.1/
Add.3, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm.
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b. Relevant Provisions of the Rome Statute
In the Rome Statute, Article 48 is the main provision ad-
dressing privileges and immunities."' Additional articles of the
Rome Statute, however, relate to privileges and immunities as
well.1 36 One example is Article 99(4) setting forth procedures
for on-site investigations to be conducted by the Court.
13 7
i. Article 48: Privileges and Immunities
Article 48 of the Rome Statute establishes the privileges and
immunities of the Court and its personnel, but leaves details to
be discussed in the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities.
1 3 1
Different officers and employees of the Court are accorded vary-
ing privileges and immunities.1 39 Article 48(2) grantsJudges1 41
the Prosecutor, 41 the Deputy Prosecutors, 42 and the Regis-
trar 43 the highest level of protection: 144 the privileges and im-
135. Rome Statute, supra note 14.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. art. 48; see PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev.1/Add.3, supra note 134.
139. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 48; see also Kenneth S. Gallant, Symposium,
The International Criminal Court: The Role and Powers of Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, 34 INT'L LAW. 21, 30 (2000) (discussing effect of Article
48 of Rome Statute).
140. Rome Statute, supra note 14. Articles 35 through 41 detail the service of
judges, qualifications, nominations and elections of judges, judicial vacancies, presi-
dency, chambers, independence of judges, and excusing and disqualification of judges.
Id. All judges shall be elected as full-time members of the Court and shall be available
to serve on that basis from the commencement of their terms of office. Id. art. 35(1).
141. Id. Article 42(1) states:
The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of
the Court. It shall be responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining
them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court. A
member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external
source.
Id. See generally id. art. 42 (enumerating role of office of Prosecutor); Id. art. 15 (discuss-
ing ability of Prosecutor to initiate investigations).
142. Id. Article 42 of the Rome Statute, in part, states: "[t]he Prosecutor shall be
assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors, who shall be entitled to carry out any of
the acts required of the Prosecutor under this Statute."
143. Id. Article 43(1) of the Rome Statute states: "[t]he Registry shall be responsi-
ble for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court, with-
out prejudice to the functions and powers of the Prosecutor in accordance with Article
42." Id. Article 43(2) states: "[t]he Registry shall be headed by the Registrar, who shall
be the principal administrative officer of the Court. The Registrar shall exercise his or
her functions under the authority of the President of the Court." Id.
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munities accorded to the heads of diplomatic missions when on
business of the Court. 145 Article 48(2) also provides such per-
sonnel immunity from legal process of every kind, even after
their terms of office have expired.
1 4 6
The privileges and immunities for the Deputy Registrar, the
staff of the Office of the Prosecutor, and the staff of the Registry,
as well as counsel, experts, witnesses, or any other person re-
quired to participate in Court proceedings, are not fully defined
in Article 48 of the Rome Statute.' 47 Article 48(3) states that the
Deputy Registrar, the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor, and
the staff of the Registry shall enjoy the privileges and immunities
necessary to carry out their functions, in accordance with the
Draft Agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Court
("Draft Agreement"). 148  This grant of functional immunity is
consistent with the privileges and immunities granted to ICTY
officials; senior officials of the' ICTY are entitled to diplomatic
immunities, and staff members of the ICTY are accorded func-
tional immunities. 1
49
Article 48(4) also leaves privileges and immunities open.' 5 °
According to Article 48(4), protections for the counsel, experts,
144. Id. art. 48(2).
145. Id.
146. Id. This is in respect of words spoken or written and acts performed by them
in their official capacity. Id. Article 48(2) provides that the judges, the Prosecutor, the
Deputy Prosecutors, and the Registrar shall:
[W]hen engaged on or with respect to the business of the Court, enjoy the
same privileges and immunities as are accorded heads to diplomatic missions
and shall, after the expiry of their terms of office, continue to be accorded
immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or writ-
ten and acts performed by them in their official capacity.
Id.
147. Id. arts. 48(3) and (4); see also Gallant, supra note 139, at 30-31 (noting that
defense counsel is given far fewer powers than prosecutorial counterparts and that if
agreement on privileges and immunities ofcourt is drafted with sensitivity towards de-
fense function, there may be substantial protections for defense counsel).
148. Rome Statute, suipra note 14, art. 48(3). Article 48(3) provides that such per-
sonnel shall "enjoy the privileges and immunities and facilities necessary for the per-
formance of their functions, in accordance with the agreement on the privileges and
immunities of the Court." Id.; see also Draft Agreement, supra note 134.
149. Id.; ICTY Statute, supra note 6.
150. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 48(4). Article 48(4) states: "Counsel, ex-
perts, witnesses or any other persons required to be present at the seat of the Court
shall be accorded such treatment as is necessary for the proper functioning of the
Court, in accordance with the agreement on the privileges and immunities of the
Court." Id.
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witnesses, and others will not have diplomatic-type privileges and
immunities.151 Finally, the privileges and immunities of ICC per-
sonnel may be waived according to procedures set out in Article
48(5).152
ii. Article 99: Execution of Requests under Articles 93 and 96
On-site investigations are an extremely sensitive issue be-
cause investigations that are conducted by persons other than
national law enforcement officers, intrude upon the sovereignty
of the state on whose territory the investigations take place.
153
The normal procedure for conducting investigations in the terri-
tory of a state party is governed by. the rules in Part 9 of the
Rome Statute dealing with international cooperation and judi-
cial assistance.1 51 In certain situations, however, the rules in Part
9 do not have to be followed.and the Pre-Trial Chamber 15 5 may
authorize the Prosecutor to take the necessary steps within the
territory of a state party.1 56
151. Gallant, supra note 139, at 31.
152. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 48(5).
153. See Bert Swart & Goran Sluiter, The International Criminal Court and Interna-
tional Criminal Co-operation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRLAAN Bos 91, 113-14 (Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds.,
1999) (discussing procedure for conducting on-site investigations). Sovereignty con-
cerns also arose during the negotiations of the Rome Statute. John T. Holmes, The
Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE; ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41, 41 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). Certain
states, while supporting the ICC's creation, were hesitant to create a body that could
intrude on national sovereignty. Id. These concerns are now embodied in the Rome
Statute as the principle of complementarity, whereby the ICC complements national
courts. Id.
154. Rome Statute, supra note 14; see Fabricio Guariglia, International Criminal Law
Procedures; Investigation and Prosecution, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE; ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 227, 232 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
1999) (describing debate over this issue during treaty negotiations). For a further dis-
cussion on the initiation of investigations and prosecutions and the evaluation by the
Prosecutor, see Bartram S. Brown, The Statute of the ICC: Past, Present, and Future, in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw 61, 73-76 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen, eds., 2000).
155. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 39. Article 39, in part, states:
(1) As soon as possible after the election of the Judges, the Court shall organ-
ize itself into the divisions specified in Article 34, paragraph (b). The
Appeals Division shall be composed of the President and four other
Judges, the Trial Division of not less than six Judges and the Pre-Trial
Division of not less than six Judges.
Id.
156. See Guariglia, supra note 154, at 232 (detailing process of conducting on-site
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Article 99(4) of the Rome Statute grants the ICC Prosecutor
the power to conduct on-site investigations, albeit only under
strict conditions.157 An on-site investigation may be performed
without the express consent of a state only if that state is a state
party.15 Article 99(4) also mentions some forms of on-site inves-
tigations, such as the interview of witnesses without the presence
of national authorities and the examination of a public site or
other public place.159 The examination of a public site may give
rise to difficulties, especially where the exhumation of graves is
concerned.
160
investigations). This exception only' applies if the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that a
state clearly is unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the inability of any
competent judicial system. Id. at 233; Rome Statute, supra note 14. Article 57(3)(d),
reads that the Pre-Trial Chamber may:
[a]uthorize the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within the terri-
tory of a state party without having secured the cooperation of that state under
Part 9 if, whenever possible having regard to the views of the state concerned,
the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined in that case that the state is clearly
unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the unavailability of any
authority or any component of its judicial system competent to execute the
request for cooperation under Part 9.
Id.
157. Id. Article 99(4) reads:
Without prejudice to other Articles in this Part, where it is necessary for the
successful execution of a request which can be executed without any compul-
sory measures, including specifically the interview of or taking evidence from a
person on a voluntary basis, including doing so without the presence of the
authorities of the requested state party if it is essential for the request to be
executed, and the examination without modification of a public site or other
public place, the Prosecutor may execute such a request directly on the terri-
tory of a state as follows:
(a) When the state party requested is a state on the territory of which the
crime is alleged to have been committed, and there has been a deter-
mination of admissibility pursuant to articles 18 or 19, the Prosecutor
may directly execute such request following all possible consultations
with the requested state party;
(b) In other cases, the Prosecutor may execute such request following con-
sultations with the requested state party and subject to any reasonable
conditions or concerns raised by that state party. Where the requested
state party identifies problems with the execution of a request pursu-
ant to this subparagraph it shall, without delay, consult with the Court
to resolve this matter.
Id. Guariglia, supra note 154, at 232-33; Swart, supra note 153, at 114-15.
158. Guariglia, supra note 154, at 232.
159. See Swart, supra note 153, at 115 (noting that forms mentioned were particu-
larly useful to drafters of Rome Statute).
160. See id. (noting usefulness of this form of investigation).
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Commentators note several criticisms of Article 99(4).161
First, Article 99(4) limits the ability to conduct on-site investiga-
tions to the Prosecutor. 6 2 Second, the Prosecutor appears to be
granted no more privileges than a tourist in a foreign state.' 63
Given the reluctance of states to allow on-site investigations,
Article 99(4) is an achievement reached by consensus on an ex-
tremely sensitive issue.' 64 The recent refusal by the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia to allow ICTY Prosecutor Arbour to enter
Kosovo in order to carry out on-site investigations provides an
example of the sensitivity of the issue.' 65 After the Court enters
into force, the question of whether or not Article 99(4) provides
an adequate legal framework enabling the Court to effectively
fulfill its mandate, will be answered.'
66
2. The Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities
of the ICC
While Article 48 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC
shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary to
fulfill its purposes, Articles 1 through 28 of the Draft Agree-
ment 1 6 7 expand upon this notion and set forth specific provi-
sions governing the Court and its personnel.'68 The Draft
Agreement grants privileges and immunities first to the Court
itself and then to the different levels of personnel of the
Court.'6 9 The Draft Agreement also contains provisions in-
tended to deal with abuse by all persons enjoying such privileges
and immunities pursuant to the Draft Agreement.
170
161. Id.; Guariglia, supra note 154, at 233.
162. Swart, supra note 153, at 115; Guariglia, supra note 154, at 233.
163. Swart, supra note 153, at 115; Guariglia, supra note 154, at 233.
164. See Swart, supra note 153, at 114-15.
165. See id. at 114 (noting that sensitivity relates to state conduct).
166. Medard R. Rwelamira, Composition and Administration of the Court, in THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE; ISSUES, NEGOTIA-
TIONS, RESULTS 153, 167-68 (Roy S. Lee, ed., 2000). See Swart, supra note 153, at 115.
167. Draft Agreement, supra note 134. The Draft is based on three main agree-
ments: the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the U.N., the Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and
the Headquarters Agreement between the U.N. and the Kingdom of the Netherlands
concerning the ICTY. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The Draft Agreement also contains three notification and travel provi-
sions. Id. Article 20 confirms that the Registrar shall periodically communicate to all
state parties the names of persons to which the provisions of the agreement apply. Id.
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a. Provisions Governing Privileges and Immunities of
ICC Personnel
Articles 1 through 11 of the Draft Agreement set forth stan-
dard privileges and immunities for the Court. 71 Articles 14
through 17 provide the privileges and immunities of the person-
nel of the Court.172 Article 14 grants the same privileges and
immunities to the Judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecu-
tors, and the Registrar as heads of diplomatic missions receive
under the Vienna Convention.7 3 Such immunity applies during
official journeys, 17 in times of international crises, 175 and even
Article 21 provides for the freedom of movement of Court officials by allowing ICC
personnel to travel with the U.N. laissez-passer. Id., Finally, Article 22 provides that
applications for visas shall be processed quickly. Id. The Draft Agreement concludes
with provisions for settlements of disputes, signature and ratification, entry into force,
denunciation, depositary, and authenticity of texts. Id.
171. See Draft Agreement, supra note 134, arts. 1-11 (providing legal status and
juridical personality, inviolability of premises, archives and all documents, immunity of
property, funds and assets; exemptions from taxes, customs duties, and import or ex-
port restrictions; reimbursement from duties and/or taxes; and finally, facilities in re-
spect of communications). Article 11 provides the facilities in respect of communica-
tions. Article 11 states:
(1) The Court shall enjoy in the territory of each state party for the purposes
of its official communications and correspondence treatment not less
favorable than that accorded by the state party concerned to any intergov-
ernmental organization or diplomatic mission in the matter of priorities,
rates and taxes applicable to mail and the various forms of communica-
tion and correspondence.
(2) No censorship shall be applied to the official communications or corre-
spondence of the Court.
(3) The Court may use all appropriate means of communication, including
electronic means of communication, and shall have the right to use codes
or cipher for its official communications and correspondence. The offi-
cial communications and correspondence of the Court shall be inviolable.
(4) The Court shall have the right to dispatch and receive correspondence
and other materials or communications by courier or in sealed bags,
which shall have the same privileges, immunities and facilities as diplo-
matic couriers and bags.
(5) The Court shall have the right to operate radio and other telecommunica-
tions equipment on its registered frequencies and those allocated to it by
the states parties concerned.
Id.
172. Draft Agreement, supra note 134, arts. 14-17.
173. Draft Agreement, supra note 134, art. 14(1). According to Article 1 (n) of the
Draft Agreement "Vienna Convention" means the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 18 April 1961. Id. art. 1(n).
174. Id. art. 14(2).
175. Id. art. 14(4).
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after the expiry of their office.17 6 Article 14 also permits such
personnel and their families the right to enter and leave the
country where the Court is sitting.177 Paragraph 6 of Article 14
provides the Judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors,
and the Registrar complete freedom of speech and indepen-
dence, granting immunity from legal process both during and
after their term of office.' 78
Article 15 sets forth the privileges and immunities for the
officials of the Court. Article 1(1) of the Draft Agreement de-
fines officials as: the Deputy Registrar and the staff of the offices
of the Prosecutor and the Registry.' 79 As explained in Article
48(3) of the Rome Statute, officials are accorded the privileges
and immunities necessary for the independent performance of
their functions, in any country where they may be on business or
may pass through.18 0 Article 15 then sets forth a list detailing
immunities for the officials.18 1
The Draft Agreement also grants privileges and immunities
to Counsel, witnesses, experts, and other persons required to be
at the seat of the Court.l8 2 Article 16(1) provides that Counsel
before the Court shall be accorded the treatment necessary for
the proper functioning of the Court.8 3 It also provides for privi-
leges and immunities for the independent performance of their
duties during the period of their missions.'8 4 According to Arti-
176. Id. art. 14(5).
177. Id. art. 14(2).
178. Id. art. 14(6). Article 14 also exempts the salaries, emoluments, and the al-
lowances paid to such personnel from taxation. Id. art. 14(7).
179. Id. art. 1(1).
180. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 48(3); Draft Agreement, supra note 134, art.
15.
181. Draft Agreement, supra note 134, art. 15 (providing immunity from personal
arrest, seizure of personal baggage, legal process in respect of words spoken or written
and all acts performed in official capacity, and national service obligations). Article 15
also provides for inviolability of official papers and exemption from taxation and from
immigration restrictions. Id. arts. 15(c), (d), (f), and (j). Article 15 also provides an
exemption from inspection of personal baggage, but creates an exception if there are
grounds for believing the baggage contains Articles not for personal use. Id. art. 15(g).
182. Id. arts. 16-17.
183. Id. art. 16(1).
184. Id. This paragraph then accords immunity from personal arrest, immunity
from seizure of their baggage and from legal process of very kind in their official capac-
ity, inviolability of documents, the right to receive sealed correspondence, exemption
from immigration restrictions and inspection of personal baggage, and the repatriation
facilities in time of international crises as are accorded to diplomatic agents under the
Vienna Convention. Id.
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cle 17, experts, witnesses, and other persons required to partici-
pate in Court proceedings are entitled to the treatment neces-
sary for the proper functioning of the Court.18 5 During the pe-
riod of their missions, such individuals are provided with the
same privileges and immunities provided for Counsel in Article
16, subparagraphs (a) to (f).6
b. Provisions Governing Abuses by ICC Personnel
The Draft Agreement also contains provisions regarding the
abuse of privileges and immunities.8 7 First, Article 18 provides
that the Court shall cooperate with state authorities to prevent
the occurrence of any abuse in connection with privileges and
immunities. 88 Additionally, Article 18 requires that all persons
enjoying privileges and immunities respect the laws of the state
party in whose territory they may be on.1 8 9 Second, Article 19
permits the possibility of a waiver of privileges and immuni-
ties. 190
II. BALANCING SOVEREIGNTY WITH HUMAN
RIGHTS PROTECTION
The notion of sovereignty1 9 recognizes that each state is the
master of its own territory, except as limited by international
treaties or law.1 9 2 Sovereignty has numerous functions.193 First,
it prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction by one state over matters
185. Id. art. 17.
186. Id. arts. 16(1)(a)-(f) (defining privileges and immunities of Counsel).
187. Id. arts. 18-19.
188. Id. art. 18.
189. Id. The final sentence of Article 18(2) states: "They also have a duty not to
interfere in the internal affairs of that state." Id.
190. Id. art. 19. This is stated in Article 48(5) of the Rome Statute. Rome Statute,
supra note 14 art. 48(5).
191. See William C. Plouffe, Jr., Sovereignty in the "New World Order": The Once and
Future Position of the United States, A Merlinesque Task of Quasi-Legal Definition, 4 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 49, 52 (1996) (noting that practitioners of international law are aware
that international law is vague concept).
192. See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a
People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (1993) (noting
that international law is organized around concept of sovereignty).
193. See Patricia A. McKeon, An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle
of Sovereignty Against the Demands for International Justice, 12 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 535,
539-40 (1997) (discussing different meanings of sovereignty).
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within the territory of another state.'," Thus, it serves as a politi-
cal weapon defending the independence of a state. 195 Second, it
provides, in part, a state's sense of dignity.196 Finally, a sovereign
state has the power to provide protection to its citizens.197
Sovereignty is the underlying concept around which inter-
national law is currently organized.1 98 Some commentators note
that although sovereignty is no longer absolute, this principle
still takes precedence over human rights.' 99 Other commenta-
tors argue, however, that the interdependence of the interna-
tional community and the increased concern for human rights
are leading to a diminution of the classical notions of sover-
eignty.2 ° ° This debate echoes the classic conflict between the Re-
alist and Cosmopolitan traditions.
A. The Realist Theory
Realist thinkers argue in favor of the legal principle of non-
intervention, the duty of states to refrain from interfering in the
affairs of other states.2"1 This notion conflicts directly with the
194. See id. at 536 (noting that sovereignty has long been considered most funda-
mental right nations can possess).
195. See id. at 540 (noting that this is less abstract function of sovereignty).
196. See id. (providing that this is abstract function of sovereignty as well).
197. See id. (stating that sovereign state's power to provide security to its citizens is
most important).
198. See Grossman, supra note 192, at 1 (explaining that this principle means that
each state is master of its own territory, unless limited by international treaty).
199. See McKeon, supra note 193, at 538 (discussing sovereignty and its relation to
creation of ICC); see also Plouffe, supra note 191, at 54 (noting some theorists view that
it is duty of states not to violate territorial sovereignty of another state).
200. See McKeon, supra note 193, at 541 (claiming that combination of factors
have emerged to compromise sovereignty). The most contentious issue discussed dur-
ing the 1999 general debate at the U.N. was whether human rights or sovereignty are
more important. See Dieter Kastrup, From Nuremberg to Rome and Beyond: The Fight
Against Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 404,
411 (1999) (discussing conflicting notions of sovereignty and humanitarian interven-
tion). During this U.N. debate, the United States, most European nations, and a large
number of African and Latin American nations supported the idea that human rights
should take precedence over sovereignty. Id. Other countries, such as China, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, and Sudan, argued that sovereignty takes priority over human
rights and expressed strong opposition to humanitarian intervention. Id. Numerous
other countries found themselves somewhere in the middle. Id.
201. See Ravi Mahalingam, The Compatibility of the Principle of Nonintervention with the
Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLAJ. INr'L L. & FOR. AFF. 221, 229 (1996) (elab-
orating on Realist perspective).
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protection of human rights generally. 20 2 In current interna-
tional law, however, state sovereignty continues to be essential,20 3
and thus it can be argued that the Realist tradition holds true
today.
1. An Explanation
Realist thinkers20 4 maintain that in international relations,
states, not individuals, are the principle actors. 20 5 Modern real-
ists contend that sovereignty is a right based on a presumed legit-
imacy from the people within a state's territory.20 6 From this
perspective, because sovereignty is a right, any intervention in-
fringing on that right must be prima facie illegitimate.
20 1
Realists present several arguments in favor of the legal prin-
ciple of nonintervention. 20  First, they argue that all states are
equal.20 9 This conclusion is based on a state's sovereign right to
regulate conduct within its borders and to regulate its foreign
affairs.2 10 Second, modern realists argue that non-intervention is
important for international order.211 From the realist's perspec-
tive, humanitarian intervention is likely to lead to major wars
fought with passion rather than self-interest. 212 According to
this perspective, a non-interventionist view will be less likely to
lead to a breakdown in international order.213 Thus, such schol-
202. See id. at 229-30 (discussing Realist view on legal principle of humanitarian
intervention).
203. See John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State
Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INr'L L.J. 433, 453 (1997) (discussing role of sover-
eignty in international law).
204. See Mahalingam, supra note 201, at 228 (explaining that Realists consider in-
ternational community to be anarchical in nature because there is no higher authority
and thus such thinkers doubt enforceability of international law).
205. See id. (discussing philosophical underpinnings of principle of noninterven-
tion and right of humanitarian intervention).
206. See id. at 229-30 (discussing further realist view on legal principle of humani-
tarian intervention).
207. See id. at 230 (noting importance of this concept for international order).
208. See id. at 229 (elaborating on Realist perspective); see also Plouffe, supra note
191, at 53-54 (providing views of alternative theorists).
209. See Mahalingam, supra note 201, at 229 (explaining that this is so because
states are sovereign entities).
210. See id. (claiming that all states are equal because they are sovereign entities).
211. See id. at 230 (providing that Realists assert that world government cannot be
achieved and is not necessarily desirable).
212. See id. at 231 (noting Realist view that international society should strive to
prevent major breakdowns of order without guidance of sovereign).
213. Id.
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ars argue that the international community should strive to
maintain the basis of international order by mediating and con-
taining conflict by acting rationally.
214
2. In Practice
Attempts to regulate warfare that emerged at the end of the
19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century were
linked closely to notions of state sovereignty. 215 The U.N. and
international law historically supported the doctrine of non-in-
tervention.216 The tenets of sovereignty lie at the foundation of
the principle of non-intervention.217
The concept of territorial sovereignty is embodied in Article
2(7) of the U.N. Charter.218 Article 2(7) provides that the U.N.
Charter does not authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters that
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.21 9
This Article preserves a protected sphere of domestic affairs.2 2 °
Scholars read Article 2(7) broadly to impose the prohibition of
interference by one state in the internal affairs of another.22
The U.N. Charter does not recognize the right of interven-
tion on behalf of human rights. 222 It, however, does qualify the
support for the doctrine of non-intervention with one excep-
214. See id. at 230-31 (claiming that if states behave rationally their behavior will be
more predictable and diplomacy could substitute for major wars).
215. See Leila Nadya Sadat, The Evolution of the ICC: From the Hague to Rome and Back
Again, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 31, 33 (Sarah B. Sewall et al. eds., 2000) (noting that
states at that time were subject to only their own laws).
216. See David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of
Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 203, 209 (providing background on doctrine
of non-intervention).
217. See id. (noting that states act partially out of self-interest and adopt principal
of non-intervention).
218. See id. (stating that founders of U.N. incorporated doctrine of non-interven-
tion into U.N. Charter).
219. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (stating that "[n]othing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state").
220. See Abram Chaynes & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The ICC and the Future of the
Global Legal System, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (Sarah B. Sewall et al. eds., 2000) (ex-
plaining that founders of U.N. preserved insulated sphere of domestic affairs).
221. See id. (noting that although provision reads only against United Nations, it
has been read broadly).
222. See Kresock, supra note 216, at 209 (explaining how founders of U.N. incorpo-
rated doctrine of non-intervention into U.N. Charter).
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2231htte bection. It provides that the absence of support for intervention
should not prejudice the abilities of the U.N. Security Council 224
under Chapter VII. 225
For the U.N. to take action pursuant to Chapter VII, the
Security Council must find that the controversy satisfies two re-
quirements. 226 First, the controversy cannot lie essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the state.2 2 7 Second, the controversy
must constitute a threat to international peace and security.
228
Thus, it is argued that all Member States are obliged to refrain
from acting to correct humanitarian and human rights concerns
that do not escape the territory of a state, unless there is a seri-
ous threat to international security.
229
In current international law, state sovereignty continues to
be an essential principle. States are often faced with the
choice between strengthening the enforcement capacity of inter-
national law and shielding their nationals from the reach of in-
ternational justice.231 When presented with this dilemma, most
states choose to protect their nationals.23 2
223. Id.
224. Id. The Security Council is the executive body of the U.N. that may use diplo-
matic, economic, or military means to resolve international disputes. See generally U.N.
CHARTER arts. 23-32 (discussing composition, functions, and powers of Security Coun-
cil). The Security Council is an 11-member body with five permanent members (China,
France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States) and six additional mem-
bers that are elected at two-year intervals. Id. art. 23.
225. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 states: "[Tihis principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."
226. See Kresock, supra note 216, at 209 (discussing process whereby Security
Council may act).
227. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
228. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (stating that " [t]he Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security").
229. See Kresock, supra note 216, at 209-10 (discussing process whereby Security
Council may act).
230. See Perkins, supra note 203, at 453 (discussing role of sovereignty in interna-
tional law).
231. SeeJelena Pejic, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in Inter-
national Law: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and
Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents
Matter?, 60 ALB. L. Rv. 841, 860 (1997) (discussing differences between Ad Hoc Tribu-
nals and ICC).
232. Id.
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B. The Cosmopolitan Tradition
While Realist thinkers favor the principle of non-interven-
tion, Cosmopolitan theorists advocate a legal right of humanita-
rian intervention.233 In their view, human rights must take pre-
cedence over the rights of states.23 4 In practice, it can be argued
that contemporary international law establishes that a state's
treatment of human beings in respect of their human rights is
not solely the state's business, but is a matter of international
concern.2
2 3 5
1. An Explanation
The Cosmopolitan tradition traces back to Immanuel
Kant. 236 Kant believed that people, not states, were the subjects
of the international community.2 7 The notion that the individ-
ual is the bearer of rights became a familiar concept during the
time of Hugo Grotius. 2 38 Grotius rejected the notion that inter-
national law should be confined to regulating relations between
states.23 9
Modern theorists of this tradition encourage an interna-
tional legal right of humanitarian intervention.24 ° In their view,
either the international community or an individual state may
233. See Mahalingam, supra note 201, at 236 (citing examples of such theorists as
David Luban and Fernando Teson).
234. See id. (noting that such theorists might at same time accept some form of
limited sovereignty).
235. See Perkins, supra note 203, at 443 (claiming that there exists limits on state's
sovereignty even in dealing with its own citizens).
236. See Mahalingam, supra note 201, at 235 (providing further information on
Kant's views). Immanuel Kant's contribution to the debate between non-intervention
and intervention is that he supported the doctrine of intervention in order to establish
a republican state. Id. Kant argues that intervention by one state in the affairs of a
second state can be legitimate, albeit only when the intervention occurs in order to
assist in the formation of a republic. Id.
237. See id. (stating that Kant envisioned peaceful international society could exist
only if all states had republican forms of government). Modern members of the Cos-
mopolitan perspective, such as David Luban and Fernando Teson, focus on the theme
that individuals are the principal subjects of international law. Id.
238. See Adriaan Bos, The International criminal Court: A Perspective, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE; ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS,
RESULTS 463, 468 (Roy S. Lee, ed., 1999) (comparing view held by Grotius with qualities
of Rome Statute).
239. See id. (noting that Grotius rejected view that is upheld by 19th century Posi-
tivism).
240. See Mahalingam, supra note 201, at 236 (citing examples of such theorists as
David Luban and Fernando Teson).
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invoke the right of intervention against any state that violates
human rights. 241 While accepting a form of limited sovereignty,
the modern cosmopolitan perspective emphasizes that human
rights must take precedence over the rights of states. 242
These theorists also contend that when a state commits sub-
stantial human rights violations, that state's international legiti-
macy is damaged and thus, its sovereign rights should not shield
its actions. 24 3 The right to intervene on behalf of humanitarian
concerns should exist because such intervention is just and
serves to establish true legitimacy. 244 From the modern cosmo-
politan perspective, states exist to preserve the rights of human
beings, and the right of intervention will allow international law
to better achieve that end.2 4 5
2. In Practice
The interdependence of the international community and
the increased concern for human rights are leading to an ero-
sion of the classical notions of sovereignty. 246 Even the strong
proponents of the positivist perspective of international laW2
47
concede that the current state of international law rejects the
notion of absolute sovereignty. 248 The U.N. Secretary-General
noted recently that globalization is redefining state sover-
eignty.249
Contemporary international law establishes that a state's
treatment of human beings with respect to their human rights is
241. See id. (stating that in modern theorists' view, ultimate justification for state's
legitimacy is enforcement of natural rights of citizens).
242. See id. (claiming that if states exists for reason, according to cosmopolitans, it
is to protect human rights).
243. See id. at 236-37 (noting that foreign governments can intervene on behalf of
human beings).
244. See id. (suggesting that many states do not respect right to intervene).
245. See id. at 237 (summarizing Cosmopolitan views as in favor of humanitarian
intervention).
246. See McKeon, supra note 193, at 541 (noting that combination of factors have
emerged to compromise sovereignty).
247. Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International
Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 6 Duto CoMp. & INT'L L.J.
127, 142 (1995). Theorists of the positivist perspective view the community as condi-
tioned by sovereign states. Id.
248. See id. (explaining authors indicate clear repudiation of any absolutist notion
of sovereignty).
249. See Kastrup, supra note 200, at 411-12 (providing information regarding 1999
U.N. general debate).
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
not solely the state's business, but is a matter of international
concern. 250  The acceptance of this notion dramatically in-
creased over the past fifty years with the development of multilat-
eral frameworks for the protection of human rights against the
state2 1 and the increasing willingness of nations to surrender a
degree of sovereignty necessary for the prosecution of interna-
252tional crimes.
The international community first attempted to work to-
wards international cooperation through multilateral commit-
ments at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.253 At the
Second Hague Peace Conference of '1907, thirty-nine states
agreed to form an international criminal court.254 The Court,
however, did not immediately come to fruition.255 The interna-
tional community did not display the determination to prose-
cute alleged perpetrators of international crimes until the estab-
lishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.2 5 6
Regional human rights tribunals in effect today, such as the
European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, further
demonstrate the movement towards an acceptance of interna-
tional justice.257 In the 1990s, the political determination to
prosecute atrocities grew even stronger with the efforts before
250. See Perkins, supra note 203, at 443 (discussing limits on state sovereignty).
251. See Ronald A. Brand, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century:
External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685, 1694 (1995) (dis-
cussing development of binding international protections for individuals).
252. See Daniel B. Pickard, Security Council Resolution 808: A Step Toward A Permanent
International Court for the Prosecution of International Crimes and Human Rights Violations, 25
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 435, 454 (1995) (noting that although willingness of nations to
surrender some fraction of their sovereignty took generations to develop, nations are
now determined to prosecute international crimes).
253. See Roy S. Lee, supra note 14, at 36 (noting that Hague Peace Conferences
were beginnings of substantive international criminal law); see also Pickard, supra note
252, at 454 (revealing that although conferences did not succeed in establishing inter-
national criminal court, they resulted in major developments in international law).
254. See Pickard, supra note 252, at 454 (noting that acceptance of international
court in theory was major advancement in field of international law).
255. See id. (noting that this was due to nations' failure to ratify convention).
256. See id. at 454-55 (describing Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials as successful exam-
ples of temporary international criminal courts).
257. Id. at 456. The European Court of Human Rights is a creation of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, signed on November 4, 1950. Id. This convention
held governments accountable to their own citizens for violations of international law.
Id. The European Court of Human Rights served as a model for the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights 25 years later. Id. See Brand, supra note 251, at 1694 (citing
these courts as international legal mechanisms which are steps towards limits on states).
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the ICTY and ICTR.258 Since the Hague Conferences, interven-
ing treaties have had limited success due to a lack of meaningful
enforcement. 259 Finally, in 1998, the Rome Statute achieved a
permanent international institution with the ability to prosecute
and punish perpetrators of the most heinous crimes.
III. THE AGREEMENT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITH A VIEW TOWARDS
STRENGTHENED PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
In the post-Cold War era, human rights laws and the hu-
manitarian laws of war are growing stronger.261' This develop-
ment of human rights norms evidences a growing trend that in-
dividuals have rights and obligations flowing from the interna-
tional legal system.262 Beginning with the successful indictment
of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg, international jurisdic-
tion to try the most egregious crimes emerged.263 A state is no
longer immune from international scrutiny as mechanisms are
being created through which a state is held accountable for its
conduct.2 64  Thus, while sovereignty remains a recognizable
norm as acknowledged in the U.N. Charter, changing events
over time have caused states to accept a certain amount of re-
strictions on their sovereignty. 2
65
258. See MORRIS, supra note 29, at 317 (providing background information on
tribunals).
259. See Roy S. Lee, supra note 14, at 36 (discussing that success has been limited
over intervening years because meaningful enforcement seemed unattainable).
260. Id. Although individual responsibility is not a new concept, the way in which
it is elaborated in the Rome Statute is novel. Bos, supra note 238, at 468. For the first
time, general principles of criminal law and procedural regulations are part of the defi-
nitions of crimes. Id.
261. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text (discussing contemporary no-
tion that treatment of human beings is matter of international concern).
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text (describing historical attempts
by international community to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes).
264. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text (providing examples of interna-
tional and regional tribunals already in place).
265. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (explaining effect of Article
2(7) of U.N. Charter); see also supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text (noting ero-
sion of notion of absolute sovereignty).
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A. The Need For a Strong Privileges and Immunities Agreement as
Evidenced by Current Trends in International Law
The adoption of the Rome Statute, the continuous support
of the Rome Statute by over 130 nations, and the ongoing
PrepCom negotiations evidence the growing concern for the
promotion of human rights. 26 6 Once the ICC enters into force,
it must be functional to be consistent with the international com-
munity's commitment to human rights. 26 7 The various practical
arrangements being prepared by the PrepCom will significantly
impact the functioning of the Court.268 In particular, the Privi-
leges and Immunities Agreement of the ICC will potentially pro-
vide the ICC Prosecutor with the ability to conduct on-site inves-
tigations in an efficient manner.269
The power to conduct on-site investigations, an essential ele-
ment of the ICC, already belongs to the Prosecutor. 27" The en-
tire framework of the ICC will be less efficient without the au-
thority to conduct such investigations independently. Thus, the
task ahead is to provide the Prosecutor and other personnel with
necessary tools for the effective fulfillment of their mandates.27'
The Draft Agreement must provide sufficient privileges and im-
munities to personnel to be consistent with the growing political
will to enforce the protection of human rights.
272
Addressing sovereignty concerns, the Court will be based on
national procedures supplemented by the Court according to
the complementarity regime.273 Thus, states retain the primary
obligation to prosecute crimes of international concern, and it is
only when a national system is unwilling or unable to prosecute
266. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Rome
Statute and high number of countries supporting Court); see also supra notes 131-34 and
accompanying text (noting progress made by PrepCom).
267. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting ICC will enter into force
upon 60th ratification).
268. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (providing list of practical ar-
rangements to be negotiated by PrepCom).
269. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (describing procedure whereby
ICC Prosecutor may conduct on-site investigations).
270. Id.
271. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (explaining that effective ICC re-
quires Prosecutor who is independent and has ability to access information).
272. See supra notes 246-60 and accompanying text (discussing increased protec-
tion of human rights).
273. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (describing Court's complementar-
ity regime).
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that the ICC will have jurisdiction.Z74 Other sovereignty con-
cerns that states may possess regarding the Court relate to the
privileges and immunities agreement. 275 Although commenta-
tors observe that there is generally high compliance with the law
of diplomatic immunity, in diplomatic relations the reciprocal
benefits of compliance are visible. 276 This notion of reciprocity,
however, is not present in the same manner with regards to in-
ternational criminal tribunals. Thus, the realist notion of inter-
national law, taken together with the possibility of abuse of privi-
leges, presents an argument for a lower level of privileges and
immunities. 2
77
There are several arguments, however, against such a view.
First, the level of abuse by diplomats in recent decades is mini-
mal, as evidenced by the generally high compliance level. 278 Sec-
ond, the examples of abuse did not occur in the course of, or
related to, any official duties. 2 79 Finally, the Draft Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC provides provisions for
dealing with instances of abuse 8s° Most notable is the ability to
waive any privileges and immunities in cases where they can be
waived without prejudice to the purpose for which they are ac-
corded. 281 The incidents of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes are far more numerous than the occurrence of
abuse by diplomats. Thus, states should be more concerned with
providing increased privileges and immunities to ICC personnel
in order for such persons to effectively carry out investigations.
B. Specific Issues and Provisions to Address in the Draft Agreement
Noncompliance undermined the credibility and the effec-
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 167-86 and accompanying text (discussing Draft Agreement in
detail).
276. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting success of Vienna Conven-
tion is due partially to notion of reciprocity).
277. See supra notes 205-14 and accompanying text (providing explanation of Real-
ist tradition).
278. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (acknowledging small number
of diplomatic abuses).
279. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (describing instances of abuse).
280. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing Articles of Draft
Agreement that provide protection from abuse of immunities).
281. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (describing Article 48(5) of Rome
Statute).
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tiveness of the ICTY, 2 8 2 and one cannot assume that the situation
will be any different with respect to the ICC. Thus, certain areas
should be flagged as having a high potential for non-coopera-
tion in order to provide U.N. delegates with the opportunity to
strengthen such provisions during negotiations.
First, the case of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy demonstrates
the importance of the notion of immunity from legal process.
283
An increasing number of U.N. experts are required to conduct
investigations in countries that are responsible for human rights
violations.28 4 ICC Prosecutors will conduct investigations in a
similar manner.285 If states take action against U.N. experts, the
only source of legal protection is civil and criminal immunity
provided for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the U.N.286 Unfortunately, the fact that a state is party to
the Convention has not always resulted in compliance. 287 Simi-
larly, ICC personnel will rely solely on the provisions in the
Rome Statute and in the Draft Agreement for their grant of priv-
ileges and immunities. 288 Thus, extra attention should be paid
to such provisions for each type of personnel.
A second area of privileges and immunities that countries
oftentimes disregard is freedom of communication. 2 9 States do
not always comply with Article 27 of the Vienna Convention,
which permits and protects free communication on the part of
the mission for official purposes. 2 ° Article 11 (3) of the Draft
Agreement provides that all official communications and corre-
282. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (describing setbacks encountered
by ICTY).
283. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing refusal of Malaysian
government to grant immunity to Cumaraswamy).
284. See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text (describing procedure whereby
ICC Prosecutor may conduct on-site investigations).
285. Id.
286. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining ICJ's decision that
Cumaraswamy was entitled to immunity under U.N. Convention on Privileges and Im-
muities).
287. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (describing Malaysia's noncom-
pliance).
288. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing privileges and im-
munities for ICC personnel).
289. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing noncompliance with
Article 27 of Vienna Convention).
290. See id. (noting that such noncompliance occurs by states possessing capacity
to intercept embassy communications).
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spondence of the Court shall be inviolable. 291 There unfortu-
nately may be little else the Draft Agreement can provide and
the level compliance with the provision will remain to be seen
according to the states involved.
Freedom of Movement is a third area of the Draft Agree-
ment that continues to be a matter of serious controversy in the
international community.292 The defiance by renegade states ex-
perienced by the ICTY regarding entry into state's territory is a
broad lesson for the ICC 293 States should not be permitted to
defy a legitimate international tribunal, especially when the Pros-
ecutor requests entry into the territory.294
Also related to freedom of movement within a state are
safety concerns for ICC personnel operating in the field. The
importance of protecting officers in the field is evidenced by the
increase in the number of killings of U.N. civilian staff since the
early 1990s. 295 Those who have come under attack are not only
military personnel, but are civilians serving in peacekeeping,
peacemaking, and humanitarian missions as well. 2 96 With the
ability to conduct on-site investigations, ICC Prosecutors will be
in similarly precarious situations.297 This situation is exacer-
bated because the Prosecutor can conduct on-site investigations
in the territory of a state without express consent, provided that
such state is a party to the treaty.2
98
The U.N. is taking strides to counter such problems with the
Safety Convention;299 however, the ICC will be an independent
treaty-based organization outside the U.N., and therefore, ICC
291. See supra note 171 (setting forth text of Article 11 of Draft Agreement).
292. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (describing defiance by states of
Vienna Convention); see also supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (discussing refusal
of government of Former Yugoslavia to allow ICTY Prosecutor Arbour to enter Kosovo).
293. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting commentators' opinion that
obstruction by governments should not be permitted).
294. Id.
295. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining increase in killings of
U.N. staff in recent years).
296. See id. (describing individuals coming under attack).
297. See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text (describing procedure whereby
ICC Prosecutor may conduct on-site investigations).
298. Id.
299. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Safety
Convention).
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personnel cannot rely on this convention. 00 One possible solu-
tion is to expand the definition of Associated Personnel in the
Safety Convention to include ICC investigators.
CONCLUSION
World War II offered a powerful lesson in the danger inher-
ent in an international legal order based upon the notions of
absolute sovereignty. This lesson provided the impetus for the
creation of organizations such as the U.N. and led to a diminu-
tion of the concept of sovereignty to protect human rights.
There is a growing consensus that the international community
is no longer prepared to stand aside and tolerate a government
committing violations of fundamental human rights.
The adoption of the Rome Statute is evidence of the world
commitment to the advancement of human rights. The world,
however, does not have to make a choice between national sover-
eignty and human rights. Concerns over violations of sover-
eignty by diplomats are minimal as compared to the incidents of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Because
there is little evidence of diplomatic abuses, and because one
would expect diplomatic abuses to occur more frequently than
those committed by personnel of an international organization
seeking to promote human rights, the granting of immunities to
the ICC Prosecutor will not be a severe diminution to the notion
sovereignty.
Now that the commitment to advance human rights is evi-
dent, it would be unthinkable to undermine the potential of the
Court's personnel with ineffective tools. One of the final steps
towards an effective ICC is the adoption of the Draft Agreement.
The U.N. delegates at the PrepCom should note the trend to-
ward the protection of human rights in the international com-
munity and negotiate the agreement with a view towards increas-
ing the privileges, immunities, facilities, and exemptions of the
Court and its personnel.
300. See supra note 89 (describing types of personnel covered by Safety Conven-
tion).
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